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Persons, Participating, and "Higher
Law"
Patrick McKinley Brennan*
I.
Nearly a decade ago Steven Smith published something short called
Legal Theories Nobody Believes.' It is a searching, sobering assessment of
the well-known work of two influential contemporary legal scholars.2 Like
Smith, I do not recommend the two books.3 I mention the review because
its memorable title telegraphs the main point Smith develops at length in his
more recent and splendid book, Law's Quandary.4 Smith's thesis is that
nobody or almost nobody believes what gets said in justification of what we
do in the name of the law but meanwhile we go on practicing said law-and
* B.A., Yale College (philosophy), M.A., University of Toronto (philosophy), J.D., Berkeley
Law, law clerk to the Hon. John T. Noonan, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. This paper was prepared for presentation at the conference "Is There a Higher Law? And.
Does It Matter?" at Pepperdine University on February 21-22, 2008, and it remains here, apart from
a few minor changes and the addition of footnotes, just as it was presented in Malibu. I am grateful
to Robert Cochran for the invitation to participate in the conference and to Lindsay Bish for her fine
research assistance. I have benefited from countless conversations about these topics with Michael
Moreland.
1. Steven D. Smith, Legal Theories Nobody Believes, FIRST THINGS: A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, Nov. 2000, at 32 [hereinafter Smith, Legal Theories].
2. Id. at 32.
3. Id. at 34, 36-37. Smith rejects Frank I. Michelman's conclusion in Brennan and Democracy,
as noncommittal, as it states: "Here's something that you-you nonspecialists-might find
persuasive. Justice Brennan might even have believed it. As for me, well, I might and I might not."
Id. at 34. Smith then discusses Tinsley Yarbrough's The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution, and
is unimpressed by its academic credibility, stating "[v]cry occasionally Yarbrough attempts to
supplement his summarizing with what might be classified as analysis, but he avoids taxing the
readers' patience with these efforts." Id. at 36-37.
4. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (Harvard Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter SMITH,
LAW'S QUANDARY]. Smith's book has been the subject of two law review symposia. The first grew
out of a conference at the Columbus School of Law and included papers by Smith himself, William
Wagner, Justice Antonin Scalia, Joseph Vining, Lloyd Weinreb, and Patrick McKinley Brennan.
See 55 CATH. U. L. REv. (2006). The second, which grew out of a conference at the Notre Dame
Law School, appeared in the San Diego Law Review and included papers by Smith himself, Joseph
Vining, Brian Bix. Lawrence Solum, and Patrick McKinley Brennan. See 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
(2007).
475
even charging clients more for our professional services. As Smith sees it,
law's quandary is that we are in collective bad faith about what we do in
law. The practice of law goes along pretty much as it always has since the
middle ages, but the cognoscenti no longer believe-indeed they disbelieve
and regularly deny-law's traditional theoretical supports.5
The trouble is not that we have given up doing law. Statutes, legislative
rules, interpretative rules, administrative decisions, judicial decisions, and
such are being produced in record numbers across the United States today.
The statutory codes swell, the case reporters go into new series, and the
Government Printing Office can barely keep up with our zeal to regulate
from soup to intrauterine devices. Lawyers are called to the bar, judges are
translated from one bench to another, and the Great Writ of habeas corpus
occasionally issues. We are awash in the badges and incidents of law. As
Oliver O'Donovan has observed, today "[a]n incessant stream of lawmaking
[would seem to be] the fundamental proof of political viability." 6
Appearances, the appearances of lawfulness, are kept up.
Meanwhile, however, there is a spreading suspicion that the legal
materials are being pumped out like a mint prints money after abandoning
the gold standard. There are more of them, to be sure; but what in the world
are they worth? What do the legal materials stand for? What stands behind
them? Who stands behind them? Law's quandary is that we can cite and
practice law, but meanwhile the cognoscenti remark that the emperor's
wardrobe isn't what it used to be. Appearances are getting a little thin.
The widening worry is that law may turn out to be just what Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., adopting the outlook of "the bad man," declared
in 1897: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.' ' 7 What stands behind the
superabundance of legal materials? Many suspect that the answer may not
be a what (law) but a who: Men and women who are unconstrained by law.
The view expressed in the preceding sentence is that of "legal realism,"
the view that, thanks to the industry of Holmes and his legion disciples,
came to dominate much of twentieth century jurisprudence.8 "Realism" in
law is virtually the opposite of what it is in epistemology or metaphysics. In
law, realism is about the absence or the withdrawal of law that is there to be
known. It is the position according to which the possibility of living under
law is a fairy tale, the tissue of noble (or ignoble) lies and fictions with
5. See SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY, supra note 4, at 164, 179.
6. Oliver O'Donovan, Government as Judgment, in BONDS OF IMPERFECTION: CHRISTIAN
POLITICS, PAST AND PRESENT 207, 213 (2004).
7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897).
8. For a crisp and compendious survey of the trend and topics of twentieth century Anglo-
American jurisprudence, see Robert P. George, What Is Law? A Century of Arguments, FIRST
THINGS: A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, Apr. 2001, at 23-29.
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which officials armed with the coercive power of the state wallpaper over
their (virtually) unfettered discretion. Justice Antonin Scalia reveals himself
to be a realist-of a peculiar sort, to be sure-in the following confession:
"That is why, by the way, I never thought Oliver Wendell Holmes and the
legal realists did us a favor by pointing out that all these legal fictions were
fictions: Those judges wise enough to be trusted with the secret already
knew it." 9 There will be more to say at the end about Justice Scalia's Plan
B, which, as everyone knows, is to insist that texts are law and persons are
the problem to be overcome. 10
The important general question is this: With the toothpaste already out
of the tube and legal theory all around that does not support how we actually
practice law, what are we to do?
Well, Holmes died, Justice Scalia et al. could resign, and, as Justice
Clarence Thomas has recently volunteered in an interview that included the
topic of his level of job (dis)satisfaction, he has his "motor coach" to look
forward to." But what about the rest of us? After all, we need a workable
legal system in order to exchange goods, receive compensation for tortious
injuries, incarcerate criminals, regulate the content of peanut butter, and, of
course, to ensure the freedoms both to bum the flag and "to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life,"' 2 do we not? And, surely, it would be better not to think of
what we do in the name of the law as mere fiction and fairy tale. What can
take away your loved one's, your enemy's, or your own life or liberty is-
there is no mistaking it-an inherently serious business. We may laugh
about regulating through law the percentage of peanuts that is required
before a product can be labeled "peanut butter," but Justice Kennedy
probably was not laughing when he concluded that it is on account of
"liberty ... in its more transcendent dimensions" that there is (now) a right
in law to engage in homosexual sex. 13 But did the Justice remember that
9. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE. W. RES. L.
REv. 581,589 (1989-1990).
10. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 277 (2002); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Locating Authority in Law, and Avoiding the
Authoritarianism of "Textualism, " 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 761, 766, 788 (2008).
11. See Rush Interviews Justice Clarence Thomas, (Oct. 1, 2007) www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/
daily/site 100107/content/01125106.guest.html.
12. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (abortion); see also Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning).
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
one of the legal realists' favorite epithets for the jurisprudence they rejected
is "transcendental nonsense?"14
II.
Legal realism in its pure and unadulterated form burned like wildfire in
the academy until, half way through the last century, the fires of the Nazi gas
chambers made necessary the trials at Nuremberg. Many of those who were
realists before the legally-sanctioned charring of millions were chastened
and hastened to look again for reason to conclude that whatever judges (and
other state officials) "do in fact" is not ipso facto law to be obeyed.
Mercifully, World War II and its aftermath prompted a recrudescence of
intellectual interest in the possibility that the effects of "positive law" must
be limited by the requirements of justice. And this line of inquiry in turn led
people to inquire again of "higher law," including of natural law and natural
rights. Jacques Maritain catches the spirit of this recovery of sense as
follows:
[W]hen it comes to the application of basic requirements of justice
in cases where positive law's provisions are lacking to a certain
extent, a recourse to the principles of Natural Law is unavoidable,
thus creating a precedent and new judicial rules. That is what
happened, in a remarkable manner, with the epoch-making Nazi war
crimes trial in Nuremberg. 15
Holmes had been characteristically dogmatic in his dismissal of natural
law (and natural right): "The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me
to be in that naYve state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and
accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by
all men everywhere."' 16 But that was back in 1918. From Auschwitz, then
Nuremberg, and then the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights right
up to the present, "higher law" has again been on the table, or at least on
most people's. While Alasdair Maclntyre, for example, does affirm the
existence of the natural law, he also is of the opinion that belief in natural
rights is of a piece with belief "in witches and in unicorns."' 7 Surely Ralph
Mclnemy is right that "[t]he pleasure the Catholic might find in mocking
growing lists of human rights is dimmed when he finds the Magisterium
14. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935).
15. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 95 n. 12 (1951).
16. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 312 (1920).
17. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69 (3d ed. 2007).
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addressing him with this same language,"' 18 but still that does not settle the
question of who is right and who is wrong. Some, such as Alan Gewirth,
affirm natural rights but not natural law. 19 And Pope Benedict XVI himself,
without by any means denying the existence of the natural law, has observed
that today, for many, "[the] last surviving element [of the doctrine of natural
law] is human rights."20  The natural law, as an instrument of discourse
about how to order our conduct and affairs, "has become blunt. '1
What are we to do? In an effort to address what Smith diagnosed as
law's quandary, some have suggested that perhaps what we need to do is to
"re-mystify" the law.22 We need, in other words, to look at law the way
people did before the realists washed us with their "cynical acid.",23 Perhaps
this is not a hopeless enterprise. I am told that, under the right
circumstances, toothpaste can be reintroduced into the tube, and even after
the depredations of the sacred liturgy that Catholics and others have become
familiar with over the last forty years, there remains the possibility that Pope
Benedict XVI's commendable recent efforts concerning the proper
celebration of liturgy will result in a "re-mystification" of the Holy Sacrifice
of the Mass, at least for some. 4
But what of the law? What would it even look like to "re-mystify" what
Holmes described, quite correctly, as a "well-known profession?"
I would stress that loose talk about "higher law" risks inviting the
Holmesian dismissal of the "brooding omnipresence in the sky.",25 Just as
one man's modus ponens is another's modus tollens, one man's re-
mystification is another's obscurantism-and obscurantism is out of place in
inherently serious enterprises. In inquiring about the place of "higher law"
in potentially resolving law's quandary, I shall put a premium on what can
18. Ralph Mclnerny, Natural Law and Human Rights, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 12 (1991).
19. See, e.g., ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS
1-78 (Univ. of Chicago 1982).
20. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER (Pope Benedict XVI), VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 39
(Brian McNeil trans., 2006).
21. Id. at 38.
22. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATI'ER OF INTERPRETATION 63 (1997).
23. See Holmes, supra note 7, at 462.
24. These efforts are evident in the Pope's own celebrations of the Mass, his many and frequent
teachings on liturgy, and in the motu proprio allowing broader use of the Missal of Blessed Pope
John XXIII (commonly known as the Tridentine Mass). See Letter of His Holiness Benedict XVI to
the Bishops on the Occasion of the Publication of the Apostolic Letter "Motu Proprio data"
Summorum Pontificum on the Use of the Roman Liturgy Prior to the Reform of 1970 (July 7, 2007),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/benedict-xvilletters/2007/documents/hfbenxvi let_
20070707_lettera-vescovi en.html.
25. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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be said that seems reasonable, not mysterious-understanding all the while
that, first, what is reasonable does not compel the mind's assent and, second,
what is reasonable exceeds what narrow rationalism and scientism postulate.
The position I shall sketch is definitely theological, but rigorous theology is
not a grasp in the direction of "re-mystification."
A first step in the direction of clarity might be to observe that the phrase
"higher law" is not accompanied by a philosopher's or a theologian's
definition of the same. Its meaning is obscure and varied. Popularized by
Edward Corwin in his 1928-1929 essay "The 'Higher Law' Background of
American Constitutional Law, ' 26 both before Corwin and after, it has been
used to refer to a whole range of phenomena. At one end, there is the "law
regularly administered in the ordinary courts in the settlement of
controversies between private individuals"; 27 at the other, there is "natural
law" as understood in the tradition of Thomistic thought.28
Corwin observed of higher law in his sense that "the problem is not how
the common law became law, but how it became higher, without at the same
time ceasing to be enforceable through the ordinary courts even within the
field of its more exalted jurisdiction., 29 I dare say Corwin was right to
wonder about this. Over the many centuries, some densely spooky stuff has
been said about the nature and origins of the common law. Judges as
"oracles" of the same is just one example.3 °  Christopher Columbus
Landgell's common law doctrines that operate like self-moving marionettes
are another.31 The realists were right to repudiate the cultured obscurity.
But what if we ask the same question mutatis mutandis about the natural
law as understood in the Thomistic tradition? What, according to Thomas
Aquinas, is the relationship between human law and the natural law? If we
are less dismissive than Holmes but still not willing to "re-mystify," how
will the natural law fare? Does it suffer from a cognate confusion? At least
one current member of the Supreme Court has been insistent that the
"natural law" has a role to play in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution,
and although it would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that Justice
Thomas has the doctrine of Aquinas in mind, the Justice's pro-natural law
26. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (Amagi ed., LibertyFund, Inc. 2008) (1928-1929).
27. Id. at 22.
28. See Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63 (1989).
29. CORWIN, supra note 26, at 23.
30. See, e.g., JOHN DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968).
31. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L.
REv. 227, 243-45 (2002).
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stance stands as a reminder that higher law remains, at least potentially, on
the table for discussion in the conference room of the Supreme Court.32
III.
Theorizing about what over time would come to be called "natural law"
began before the fifth century B.C., and by the thirteenth century "[t]he
complexity of the tradition, the variety of the strands to be woven
together... demanded a synthesist of genius. One such was found in St.
Thomas Aquinas."33 Though there were others, and those others have their
subsequent and important histories, it is the Thomist synthesis that has had
the biggest influence and today, thanks in part to its embrace by the modem
popes (until Benedict XVI), most recommends itself for our consideration.
Even within the Thomistic tent, of course, there exist camps and lines of
division, including on the definition or status of the natural law. But,
appropriately enough for a discussion of "higher law," the line I shall pursue
takes seriously that (as one scholar has put it) "St. Thomas ... regards the
natural law as genuinely satisfying the definition of law ....
This might seem innocuous enough (after all, why wouldn't "natural
law" fit the definition of "law"?), so let me be sure to make the dog not only
bark but also bite. When in the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas comes to
consider the two extrinsic principles by which God helps humans become
good, grace and law,35 he defines law as "nothing else than an ordinance of
reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community,
and promulgated,"3 6 and from there he goes on to consider the various
"kinds" of law. Though he identifies four kinds of law, one of which is the
"natural law," we cannot rule out a priori that St. Thomas is mistaken in
concluding that natural law in fact meets his definition of law. What
Thomas or others refer to as "natural law" could turn out not to satisfy
32. For a discussion of what Justice Thomas might mean by "natural law," see SCOTT DOUGLAS
GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 36-68 (1999).
33. MICHAEL BERTRAM CROWE, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF THE NATURAL LAW 136 (1977).
34. CROWE, supra note 33, at 166. See also Steven L. Brock, The Legal Character of Natural
Law According to Thomas Aquinas (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto)
available at http://www.pusc.it/fil/p-brock/naturallawthesis.pdf.
35. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Prologue to I-Il q. 90 (Edizioni San Paolo
1988) ("Consequenter considerandum est de principiis exterioribus actuum. Principium autem
exterius ad malum inclinans est diabolus .... Principium autem exterius movens ad bonum est
Deus, qui et nos instruit per legem, et iuvat per gratiam.").
36. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 90, art. 4 c (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1947).
Thomas's definition of law, and thus to be "law" only through analogy or
metaphor. Many scholars indeed think that natural law is not quite law in
the full sense of Thomas's definition. For these, "law" as it appears in
"higher law" would need to be in scare-quotes. 37  But Thomas, whose
definition it is, thinks otherwise, and with good reason.
For St. Thomas, and I dare say for all Christians, it is bedrock that the
whole of creation is governed, even now, by God, and Thomas adopts St.
Augustine's judgment according to which such government is properly
understood as being through law: "That Law which is the Supreme Reason
cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal. 38 The
idea of government in the divine mind, promulgated from eternity and for
the common good of the universe, Thomas refers to as the "eternal law.",39
It is the exemplary instance of what Thomas has defined as law. If there is
more than one "higher law," this would be the highest. The eternal law is as
high as it gets.
From his consideration of the eternal law, Thomas turns next to ask
whether there is in man a "natural law." By the time Thomas wrote, this was
a common enough question-a fact virtually assured by St. Paul's teaching
that the pagans who did not have the Torah possessed the law in virtue of the
fact that it was engraved on their hearts, 40 a law the glossators had found fit
to describe as "natural law.",41 Thomas answers in the affirmative, of course,
but he does so in a way that is the dog's bite:
Now among all others, the rational creature [man] is subject to
Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes
of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for
others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it
has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the
natural law .... [T]he natural law is nothing else than the rational
creature's participation of the eternal law.42
Responding to an objection stating that the eternal law is sufficient, and
therefore a natural law would be (per impossible) a superfluity in creation,
Aquinas explains: "This argument would hold, if the natural law were
37. Among the names of prominent scholars who do not regard the natural law as satisfying
Thomas definition of law in a univocal way, one can mention Dom Odon Lottin, Mortimer Adler,
and John Finnis.
38. AQUINAS, supra note 36, at q. 91, art. 1.
39. Id. at q. 91 c.
40. See Romans 2:14.
41. See CROWE, supra note 33, at 77-78.
42. AQUINAS, supra note 36, at q. 91, art. 2 c.
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something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a
participation thereof ....
The doctrine is technical, of course, and I have prescinded from many of
the technicalities in order to put in as bold relief as possible the following
Thomistic thesis: the rational creature is a participant in-he has a share
in-the eternal law, the divine mind. The human person, the rational
creature, is not himself or herself a law; law is not a proper predicate of
human nature. Nor is divinity a proper predicate of the rational creature.
However, God has "instilled (inseruit) [the natural law] into man's mind so
as to be known by him naturally.",44 Through the extrinsic principles of the
natural law, God governs us interiorly. The principles are extrinsic (because
they are not part of human nature), but they are interior.45
When we ask, then, whether we are under a "higher law," the answer is
more complex than is commonly heard. The "natural law" is natural in
virtue of how we receive and hold it in our human minds. It is supernatural,
though, in its source and pedigree. The natural law is a divine law, not
simply human practical reason, but it is held in human reason and is our
sharing in the eternal law. The divine governance is at work within us,
though in our freedom we are free to flaunt God's will that we be fulfilled
and prefer instead to do what is not good for us. Perhaps gilding the dog's
bite, Aquinas observes: "The natural law has the character of law maxime." 4
IV.
One of the radical implications of Thomas's doctrine of the natural law
is that every rational person can reach a judgment, and then proceed to
action, according to a real law.47 Though some, but only some, people have
the opportunity to participate in the eternal law through that more perfect
means that is the divine positive law, every single rational person can, and
should, be about the business of making the natural law effective in his life
by reaching judgments according to its terms. Indeed, working out and
implementing the natural law would be one partial-and, admittedly, not
43. Id. at q. 91, art. 2 ad 1.
44. Id. at q. 91, art. 4 ad 1.
45. On this point and for supporting citations to Aquinas, see RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST
GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD, 294 n.58, 301 n.17
(2003).
46. AQUINAS, supra note 36, at q. 90, art. 4 ad 1.
47. On the radical consequences of every rational person's being capable of reaching moral
judgment according to a real law, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Natural Law as Subversive: The Case
ofAquinas, in 2 ETHICS AND POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS 41-63 (2006).
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very jazzy-way of describing what each of us should be up to in this life.
This is because the natural law, though an extrinsic principle, is ordered
toward our reaching our natural ends, those things that are good(s) for us
qua human.
More specifically, the natural law is the rational creature's share in the
divine government by which God leads creatures to their proper end(s), that
is, what is in fact good for them. The first precept of that law is that "good is
to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided," and from this all the
others flow. 48  "[W]hatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as
man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something
to be done or avoided., 49 As Thomas goes on to explain, all those things to
which we are naturally inclined we naturally apprehend as good and,
therefore, as to be done and pursued: "Wherefore according to the order of
natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. ' First,
then, man is inclined to the good that is common to all animals; that is, to
stay alive, to stay safe, to stay fed.5" Second, man is inclined to what is
more characteristic of him but that he shares with other animals; that is, to
have sexual intercourse, to educate offspring, and the like.52 Third, man is
inclined to that which is proper to him, and this includes living according to
reason. 53
The preceding is the merest sketch of a complex doctrine, but it is
enough to lead us to the starting points of human law. According to
Thomas, among the things that are proper to us and commanded by the
third-mentioned primary precept of the natural law, is to live with other
persons. Man's true good includes living in society, and for this reason the
natural law commands that people. associate.5 4 The idea is the familiar but
fading one, utterly repudiated by John Locke and his atomizing
descendants, 55 that sociality is an intrinsic natural perfection of the human
person, not an optional add-on. But equally familiar and not at all faded is
the idea, or rather the inescapable fact, that people coming to live together-
even very virtuous people, not to mention the rest of us-will need both to
order their common life and to provide the basis for authoritative resolution
of disputes that arise.56
48. AQUINAS, supra note 36, at q. 94, art. 2 c. et ad 1.
49. Id. at q. 94, art. 2 c.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See JOHN LOCKE: SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123-31 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980)
56. AQUINAS, supra note 36, at q. 95, art. 1.
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Thus enters the need for human law, a system of laws made by men for
their common good. Law does not begin with human law; humans can make
law because the law that they are already under requires them to do so. It is
because they are subject to the natural law that men and women are both
competent to and obligated to proceed to make human law: They must
implement the natural law and make it effective in their living. Human laws
are nothing else than ordinances of reason for the common good, made by
him or them who have care of the community, and promulgated, the
component parts of such a system will be derived from the natural law,
either by way of conclusions from premises (e.g., the prohibition against
murder) or as giving specification or determination to what is left vague by
the natural law itself (e.g., the requirements of safety will require
authoritative decisions about which side of the street people are to drive
on).57 Human law never exists apart from the eternal law. According to
Aquinas, "every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is
derived from the law of nature,"58 which, it will be recalled, is just is our
participation in the etemal law.
Even though every rational person is competent to and obligated to
reach judgments according to the natural law, individuals are not, however,
without more, competent to pass laws for the community or to impose
judgment (on individuals and groups) in the name of the community. No
one has the role of "legislator," "judge," or "executive" from the natural law
itself. The community as a whole is about the business of implementing the
natural law, but the community will need to decide the specific roles its
representatives will take vis-A-vis that work of implementation. According
to Thomas, it falls to the community, in the first instance, to create offices
for the care of the community.5 9 What is in an office depends on what the
people put there, and what exactly they put there, the labels do not entirely
reveal.
In sum, it falls to the people to decide how to make the natural law
effective in their community. 60 Different times and seasons call for different
allocations. The people may have been broad or narrow, precise or vague in
their parceling out of offices, but the issue remains ever and always the one
of determining what office the people in fact conferred. For an individual or
57. Id. at q. 95, art. 2.
58. Id.
59. See HITTINGER, supra note 45, at 72-91.
60. Id. at 74.
a sub-group to re-shape office(s) is to work a usurpation that harms the
common good.61
But what of the money question, the question whether a "judge" can
speak the natural law directly? 62 This turns out to be a question of whatjudicial office(s) the people have created. I would underline this point that is
so often overlooked. The question of what a given judicial office contains
calls for an empirical answer, not a gesture toward a Platonic form ofjudging. The judicial office is not an a priori category. Mortimer Adler,
among others, is wrong that the moral force of human law requires thatjudges be able to speak the natural law directly.63 Also wrong are those who
regard a judicial office that can speak the natural law directly as inherently
unacceptable. 64
There is nothing wrong in principle with the people's tasking judges
with speaking the natural law directly by, for example, displacing an
immoral statute with an alternative judicially-generated and morally
acceptable alternative. In a human legal system in which judges are not
tasked with speaking the natural law directly, moreover, it is competent,
indeed morally necessary, for judges not to proceed to judgment when to do
so would violate the natural law. 65  Recusal is always possible, and
resignation is the limit case.
But should judges be tasked with speaking the natural law directly?
And, in any event, have they been handed that responsibility, at least in some
measure, in our own country?
These are important questions. The answer to the first more or less
follows from what has already been said. People whose indefeasible
responsibility it is to implement the natural law should task their judges with
speaking the natural law directly when to do so would, all things considered,
alter the probabilities in favor of the natural laws being implemented.
Judges, because they are just as human as the rest of us, can mistake the
terms and true requirements of the natural law, both willfully and
inadvertently. The possibilities of a Lawrence v. Texas, which, again,
recognized that right to be free to engage in homosexual sex,66 must be
measured against those of a Pierce v. Society of Sisters,67 which recognized
the constitutional right of parents, not mentioned in the text of the
Constitution, to educate their own children.
61. Id. at 77.
62. See id. at 76.
63. See id. at 81-83.
64. Id. at 84-89 (criticizing Judge Robert Bork's expressed rejection of judicial appeals to
natural law).
65. Seeid. at 109-10.
66. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
67. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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To answer the second question would require a thorough marshalling
and evaluating of data, work that is not possible here. I shall just hint at
what I regard as the right answer by saying that I consider the Pierce case to
be correctly decided.68
V.
Would it be too much to suggest that, to the extent we are in a quandary
in law, it is because we are insufficiently Thomistic in our philosophizing
about law? Perhaps the problem that is "law's quandary" is that we measure
our legal practice against jurisprudential theories that are, as the legal realists
had the courage to say, nonsense. We do well to recall that what the realists
were reacting against was not the real Thomas Aquinas, but first, the mists
of English mythology about the common law, and second, the decadent
theories of natural law and natural rights, with an admixture of Hegelian
Geist, that had come to dominate in the post-Reformation period. The
house-cleaning was overdue.
But if we are insufficiently Thomistic in our theory, it is not so with our
practice, at least not in the main, at least not yet. Tomorrow may be another
story, but today the quotidian practice of law breathes the natural law, if
imperfectly, even as our theoreticians deny or overlook it. That practice is
nowhere better illumed, in my judgment, than in Joseph Vining's From
Newton's Sleep, 69 one of the best books ever written on law as a human
endeavor that involves whole persons. The book cannot be summarized; it
must be read, pondered, and-in the real sense of the following verb-
perused.
I do not believe that the "natural law" is mentioned by name even once
in Vining's book, but of course the foundation of the moral order neither
rises nor falls on the use of that freighted phrase. A principal insight of the
book is that the ordinary acts that cumulate as that practice we call law is
guided by something other than-higher than?-the texts and their plain
meanings. It is a matter of observation that we do not necessarily give
public effect to legislative texts. Just to pick one among his thousands of
insights and examples, Vining observes that "[1]egislation is the arbitrary
which we allow-but also limit. To make the point in its strongest form, it
could be said legislation is lawless behavior, except that by a paradoxical
68. For some, but not all, of the reasons that I think Pierce was correctly decided, see Patrick
McKinley Brennan, Harmonizing Plural Societies: The Case of Lasallians, Families, Schools-and
the Poor, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 131, 166-67 (2006).
69. JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP (Princeton Univ. Press 1995).
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trick we make legislative statements materials which we use in determining
what the law is."
70
Is this an attempt to "re-mystify" the law? Emphatically not: it is
Vining's observation about what is already present in and implicitly
affirmed by what we do day after day, season after season. His observation
could be mistaken, but it should at least be tested before being discarded.
"[I]t is too often overlooked that law is evidence of view and belief far
stronger than academic statement or introspection can provide.",71 Though
Vining's idiom is emphatically not Thomas's, the legal world as he brings it
to light is one of persons engaged in the collective struggle to create and re-
create law so as to be obedient to a law not of their own making. We make
mistakes, to be sure, but Vining sees us willingly caught up in an activity
that is as spiritual as it is practical. "Lawyers," he observes, "are caught by
legislation and their reading of it. Either they must believe what they do
with legislation is often foolish and deceptive; or they do believe and
confess a belief in an informing spirit in the legislated words that is beyond
individual legislators., 72 In sum, in our practice we are participating in
something greater than ourselves-sharing, one might say, in a higher law
and striving to subordinate ourselves to it and give it temporal effect.
VI.
Participation is a word that appeared several times in my exposition of
Aquinas on the relation between eternal law and natural law. It is a concept
that comes up on almost every page of Aquinas, though it is one he never, so
far as I am aware, defines. Perhaps it was for him, and his world, too
everywhere, if you will, to require definition. But what was everywhere for
Aquinas is almost unthinkable by us. It refers to our sharing in what is
higher and greater than we are, to our being not alone and isolated, but
always already sharers in something more. A glimpse of what Aquinas
means by "participation" emerges in this passage from his De
Hebdomadibus: "Suppose we say that air participates the light of the sun,
because it does not receive it in that clarity in which it is in the sun."73 As
Eleonore Stump has explained the Thomistic teaching on participation as it
pertains to law, "For a rational creature to participate in the eternal law is for
it to have a share of the eternal divine reason and to have a natural
70. Id. at 253.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id. at 200.
73. Thomas Aquinas, De Hebdomadibus, quoted in OWEN BARFIELD, SAVING THE
APPEARANCES: A STUDY IN IDOLATRY 90 (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1988) (1965). The theme of the
place of participation in Aquinas's metaphysics of creation is developed in FRAN O'ROuRKE,
PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF AQUINAS (2005).
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inclination to its own proper end.",74 We participate in the eternal law, and it
is thanks to this participation that we have a natural law that is a true law to
live by.
In order to know the natural law, we need not know that it is a share in
the eternal law; we need only know that the good is to be done and pursued
and evil avoided-and what rational person does not know this? The more
we know the natural law's divine pedigree, though, the more reason we will
have to obey it. But even without knowledge of the source of the law or
light, there is a brightness not to be ignored--except at one's peril. In
explaining that the natural law is nothing but our participation of the eternal
law, Aquinas begins with Psalm 4:
The light of Thy countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us: thus
implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what
is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is
nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore
evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational
creature's participation of the eternal law.75
When understood as something exterior to man, "higher law" risks
looking like a damnable intrusion. Legalism results when law is detached
from what is good for those under the law; for Thomas, the natural law
commands, but commands only what is good, and what is naturally
apprehended as such. Understood as transcendent in its source but
promulgated within the mind of the human person, natural law is true law to
live by. Which is why Vining is also right that "[t]he question what the law
'is' is not so very different from the question what we 'are' 76-unless of
course we follow the post-realist realism of Justice Scalia and pretend that
law is not, as Aquinas taught, something in the human mind, but is instead
the text that just lies there, the "'objectified' intent,, 77 the black marks on a
decaying page. Appearances need not be so thin, however. We might
recognize that we are ruled not by texts but by persons, and above all the
divine persons. (To be sure, such recognition will not be given in the idiom
74. ELEONORE STUMP, AQUINAS 88 (Routledge 2005) (2003).
75. AQUNAS, supra note 36, at q. 91, art. 2 c.
76. VINING, supra note 69, at 128.
77. SCALIA, supra note 22, at 17.
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of "neutral public reason," but that hardly counts as a dispositive blow
against the possibility of it).78
78. Having developed in this paper a sketch of the Thomistic understanding of the natural law
and some of its significance for the contemporary situation (because that was my assignment for the
conference), I should add that public discourse about the "natural law" is, in the current historical
situation, generally a bad idea. The concept is too freighted to be of much use, at least most of the
time. Even in intramural Catholic discourse, Russell Hittinger explains:
The subject of natural law was placed in the most unfortunate position of being organized
around two extreme poles. On the one end, it represented the conclusions of church
authority; on the other, it represented what every agent is supposed to know according to
what is first in cognition. We have Cartesian minds somehow under church discipline.
HITrINGER, supra note 45, at 21. Hittinger properly wams against "the impression that talk about
natural law is a rhetoric designed to achieve consensus about matters of public policy, or, worse still,
conclusions grounded in Church authority." Id. at 16. This false and dangerous impression is
avoided when one understands the natural law as true law, part of God's providential governance of
creation. And it is just such an understanding that is so scarce today, a problem, as I see it, for which
there are no cheap fixes.
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